14 16 - Strategy and Information

Institution:

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Subject:

Description:

Begins with a rigorous overview of the main equilbrium concepts for non-cooperative games in normal and extensive form, with complete or incomplete information. Defines and explores properties of iterated dominance, rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, and sequential, perfect and proper equilibria. Introduces solution concepts for cooperative games and studies non-cooperative implementations. Other topics include matching and allocation problems, auctions and mechanism design, and reputation. Bargaining and networks are recurring themes.

Credits:

4.00

Credit Hours:

Prerequisites:

Prereq: 14.12 or permission of instructor

Corequisites:

Exclusions:

Level:

Instructional Type:

Lecture

Notes:

Additional Information:

Historical Version(s):

Institution Website:

web.mit.edu/student/

Phone Number:

(617) 253-1000

Regional Accreditation:

New England Association of Schools and Colleges

Calendar System:

Four-one-four plan

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