ECON 2190D - Topics on Game Theory

Institution:

Brown University

Subject:

Description:

First, we will discuss the several elements that characterize a two-sided matching market and the concept of setwise-stability versus core. Then,we will model several of these markets (one-to-one, many-to-one and many-to-many, in the discrete and continuous cases) under the game-theoretic approach and will define for all of them the stability concept, establishing its relationship with the core and the competitive equilibrium concepts. Afterwards, we will introduce the theory of stable matching model by focusing on both the cooperative and non-cooperative aspects of the one-to-one matching markets.

Credits:

1.00

Credit Hours:

Prerequisites:

Corequisites:

Exclusions:

Level:

Instructional Type:

Lecture

Notes:

Additional Information:

Historical Version(s):

Institution Website:

www.brown.edu

Phone Number:

(401) 863-1000

Regional Accreditation:

New England Association of Schools and Colleges

Calendar System:

Semester

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